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Abstract 
A major problem for companies that develop and operate IT applications that process personal data 
of customers and employees is to ensure the protection of this data and to prevent privacy breaches. 
Failure to adequately address this problem can result in considerable reputational and financial 
damages for the company as well as for affected data subjects. We address this problem by proposing 
a methodology to systematically consider privacy issues in a step-by-step privacy impact assessment 
(so called ‘PIA’). Existing PIA approaches lack easy applicability because they are either 
insufficiently structured or imprecise and lengthy. We argue that employing the PIA proposed in this 
article, companies will be enabled to realise a ‘privacy-by-design’ as it is now widely heralded by 
data protection authorities. In fact, the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) ratified 
the approach we present in this article for the technical field of RFID and published it as a guideline 
in November 2011. The contribution of the artefacts we created is twofold: First, we provide a formal 
problem representation structure for the analysis of privacy requirements. Second, we reduce the 
complexity of the privacy regulation landscape for practitioners who need to make privacy 
management decisions for their IT applications. 
Keywords: Privacy impact assessment, privacy-by-design, security risk assessment, design science. 
 
1 Introduction 
Privacy maintenance and control is a social value deeply embedded in our societies. A global survey 
found that 88% of people are worried about who has access to their data; over 80% expect 
governments to regulate privacy and impose penalties on companies that don’t use data responsibly 
(Fujitsu, 2010). At the same time, we witness an increasing occurrence of privacy breaches, including 
massive leakage of personal data to unauthorised parties. At fast pace, technical systems transition to 
allow for unprecedented levels of surveillance as they move from centralised data base systems to 
ubiquitous computing. These developments demand for new approaches to protect privacy. 
One of these approaches is to require companies to conduct privacy impact assessments (PIAs) (see 
i.e. (EC, 2009)). Similar to established security risk assessments (ISO, 2008; NIST, 2002), the goal of 
a PIA is to make companies run through a systematic privacy risk assessment. In this way, they are 
supposed to identify organisational and technical privacy threats and choose controls that mitigate 
these. Typically, these assessments should be done early on in the development of an IT application, 
so that – following the principle of ‘privacy-by-design’1 – privacy enhancing techniques and measures 
can be pro-actively built into an application. Although, there are already some countries where PIA 
procedures are used (in particular for e-government services as well as highly sensitive areas, health 
and biometrics) (Wright et al., 2011), their adoption is very slow, especially in the private sector 
(Bennett and Bayley, 2007). This can be explained by the fact that until now PIAs are not mandatory. 
But even if PIAs were to become mandatory (as some scholars now argue (Wright, 2011)) a great 
challenge we see is that existing PIA methodologies lack easy applicability. They are cumbersome 
either because they are insufficiently structured or because they are imprecise and lengthy. As we will 
show below, none of them describe a step-by-step process a company could easily implement and 
integrate into its risk management processes. 
To address these shortcomings of existing PIAs, we propose a set of new constructs and a novel 
methodology for systematically considering privacy issues in a step-by-step PIA. We extend prior 
work in this research area by introducing experiences and concepts from security risk assessments. We 
propose a new systematic methodology that aids practitioners in evaluating relevant privacy issues and 
realising privacy-by-design. The goal of our methodology is to complement existing risk management 
techniques and provide companies that develop and operate IT applications that process personal data 
with a more formal technique for analysing application-specific privacy requirements. To achieve this 
goal we adopted a design science research approach (Hevner et al., 2004; Gregor, 2006). Design 
science research involves the construction and evaluation of IT artefacts, constructs, models, methods, 
and instantiations, by which important organisational IT problems can be addressed. Our proposed set 
of artefacts includes constructs for representing and evaluating privacy requirements and a new 
methodology for systematically considering privacy issues in a step-by-step process. Together, they 
constitute a novel process for realising an effective PIA. 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the conceptual foundations 
of existing methods for PIAs. The third section outlines the PIA methodology we propose and defines 
our constructs, including the representation of privacy requirements in the form of privacy targets and 
qualitative evaluation techniques. The fourth section provides an evaluation of the utility of our 
proposed approach. In particular, we apply our PIA process model to the technology field of RFID 
where we tested it and established it through the German Federal Office for Information Security 
(BSI) as a guideline for the development of privacy-friendly RFID applications.  
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2 Addressing privacy issues today: A review of the current 
knowledge base 
The PIA methodology we present below (Section 3) is founded upon the critical reflection of already 
existing constructs and procedures. We reflect on how existing privacy compliance procedures, 
privacy principles and regulation as well as security risk assessments informed our PIA methodology. 
2.1 Existing privacy compliance procedures 
Privacy is a broadly defined concept that goes beyond data protection (Solove, 2006). It includes, for 
example, “the right to be let alone” (Warren and Brandeis, 1890), groups’ freedom to private speech 
and association (Raab and Wright, 2012), bodily privacy, etc. A first requirement for a PIA is 
therefore that it should be able to flexibly embrace the full spectrum of these concepts. 
However, when it comes to current privacy compliance procedures (at least in Europe), typically these 
are reduced to data protection only. Data protection issues have a legal basis and are therefore subject 
to legal compliance checks conducted by national data protection authorities. Or, they are addressed 
by private auditing businesses, which offer privacy seals (i.e. (TRUSTe, 2011), (BBBOnLine, 2011), 
(EuroPriSe, 2011)). Yet, besides their limited focus on data protection, current compliance procedures 
face more challenges: First, they mostly take place at the end of the development of an application or 
even later when the application is already up and running. Thus, they review existing systems (Shroff, 
2007) a change of which can only be fixed in a bolted-on and often costly fashion. With this they often 
fall short to respond to article 20 of the European Data Protection Directive, which demands “that 
these processing operations are examined prior to the start thereof.” (EC, 1995) Second, they are not 
done by engineers designing the system, but by auditors, lawyers or data protection officials who can 
just ‘checklist’ legal compliance, but hardly influence more ‘code-based’ and rigorous privacy 
controls. And third, current compliance checks lack a standard procedure, not only because national 
data protection laws vary, but also because so far data protection has not been perceived as part of 
companies’ quality controls that are ensured by standardised risk procedures. 
As a consequence of this status quo and amounting public pressure for privacy protection, PIAs are 
now considered a key solution to offer a superior approach (EC, 2009). With their inherent risk 
management orientation they are integrating privacy considerations into the development of 
applications and thus enable privacy-by-design. Stewart (1996) describes a PIA as follows: "In large 
measure, PIAs are directed not simply towards issues of legal compliance but the policy choices 
involved in answering the questions ‘ought we to do this?”. Bennett and Bayley (2007) identified four 
common PIA requirements: (1) “conduct a prospective identification of privacy issues or risks before 
systems and programmes are put in place, or modified”, (2) “assess the impacts in terms broader than 
those of legal compliance”, (3) “be process rather than output oriented”, and (4) ”be systematic”. 
Even though process orientation has been identified as a key element of a PIA, existing PIAs largely 
fall short of it. As Figure 1a demonstrates, even the UK PIA handbook (ICO, 2009) that is heralded as 
a global “best practice publication” on how to conduct a PIA (Wright et al., 2011) is far from anything 
that governance scholars would consider a valid process reference model. No input-output factors are 
described. Process steps are so generic (“information gathering”, “internal analysis”) that they leave 
persons responsible to conduct PIAs uninformed of what to do. No guidelines or conceptual tools 
support the risk assessment. 
The first PIA with a short, but valid process model is contained in the PIA Framework for RFID (EC, 
2011) that needed to be endorsed by the Art. 29 Working Party (which explicitly demanded a risk 
evaluation process!) and was signed by the European Commission in April 6th 2011. This framework 
requires European RFID application operators to describe their system landscape, identify privacy 
risks, then mitigate such risks through appropriate controls and finally document the analysis and 
residual risks in a PIA report. The procedure outlined in the PIA Framework for RFID has received a 
lot of regulator attention as it resulted from a US-European negotiation (Spiekermann, 2012). It is 
voiced as a “landmark for privacy-by-design” by Ontario’s DPA Anne Cavoukian who invented the 
concept of privacy-by-design. Yet, again it has its own shortcomings: As the related field of security 
risk management demonstrates, risk assessments need to be very concrete and systematic. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 1b depicting the NIST risk assessment process (NIST, 2002). All steps in this 
process build on each other in a concrete and interlocked manner. Against this background we 
reviewed existing security risk processes to inform the creation of a new PIA. 
 
 
Figure 1.      a. UK PIA process overview (ICO, 2009)        b. NIST process overview (NIST, 2002) 
2.2 Security risk assessments 
Standards and guidelines for information security management in organisations are already available 
for some time. The most prominent are the ISO/IEC 27000 series and NIST Special Publications 800 
series. In Germany, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) provides industry with an IT 
Baseline Protection Catalog (“BSI IT-Grundschutz”). The latter not only complies with ISO/IEC 
27000, but describes even stricter requirements. Similar to the NIST example, all of these standards 
contain an extensive number of interlocked steps. 
Most important, all of these accepted standards offer guidelines that can be integrated into an 
organisation’s risk management processes (see: (ISO, 2008), (NIST, 2002), (BSI, 2008)). Contrary to 
the PIA process (Figure 1a), the NIST risk assessment (Figure 1b) process not only depicts the needed 
steps in much more detail but it also defines input and output artefacts for each step. Both, the detailed 
steps as well as the required artefacts enable a company to realise the risk assessment in a coherent 
way, knowing exactly what to do. In addition, these standardised security risk procedures have defined 
interfaces with system development lifecycles. This implies that security issues are already considered 
early on during the development and implementation of IT applications. The approach decreases 
bolted-on security functionality and promotes security-by-design. 
Nevertheless, researchers describe the following problems that are inherent to existing security risk 
assessments and that we consequently need to keep in mind for our proposed methodology: focus on 
process and not on content and its quality (Siponen, 2006), focus on generic security requirements and 
thus disregard of company-specific requirements (Siponen and Willison, 2009), validation based on 
common practice and not on profound research methods (Siponen and Willison, 2009). 
Seen that privacy and security are interrelated but still distinct and not synonymous (Oetzel and 
Krumay, 2011), it is not surprising that both ISO/IEC 27002 and BSI IT-Grundschutz, include privacy 
protection. Yet, despite this claim the ISO standard leaves privacy policies and measures unspecified. 
The BSI IT-Grundschutz does apply the security risk analysis to privacy principles. Yet, in doing so it 
reduces privacy protection to the concepts of anonymity, pseudonymity, unobservability and 
unlinkability (BSI, 2008). Thus, BSI (2008) does demonstrate how their security risk assessment 
method works for privacy, but it fails to embrace the wider spectrum of privacy principles as they are 
imbedded in the European Data Protection Directive or in the OECD privacy guidelines (i.e. data 
subjects’ right to transparency, collection limitation, etc.). Privacy principles that should be embraced 
by PIAs are reflected in the next section. 
2.3 Privacy principles and data protection regulation 
At the outset of any privacy analysis or PIA should be the question of what it actually is that needs to 
be protected (Rost, 2011). The oldest description of information privacy principles is the OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (OECD, 1980) that 
was adopted in 1980. These guidelines differentiate between principles of national and international 
application. Principles of national application are: collection limitation, data quality, purpose 
specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness and individual participation. Principles of 
international application are free flow and legitimate restrictions. The goal of these guidelines was to 
harmonise national laws and to motivate member states to include a certain degree of privacy 
protection into their national laws. The European Data Protection Directive hence mirrors many of 
these principles (Greenleaf, 2011): data quality, legitimate processing of personal data, legitimate 
processing of personal sensitive data, the data subject’s right to be informed, the data subject’s right of 
access to data, to correct and erase data, the data subject’s right to object, confidentiality and security 
of processing and notification. The principles show that the European Data Protection Directive 
explicitly differentiates between personal data and sensitive personal data. What is important to 
consider is that both of these major privacy frameworks focus only on information privacy issues. As 
was noted above, however, privacy is actually a wider concept. Therefore, if PIAs are to embrace the 
whole privacy arena, then protection goals will probably need to go beyond current legal frameworks 
and agreements. And indeed this is what thought leaders currently argue for when they propose that 
PIAs should extend beyond their current limited focus on individual privacy and embrace privacy as a 
social and political construct (Raab and Wright, 2012). 
3 PIA methodology and constructs 
Against the background of the reviewed knowledge base we can now present the PIA methodology we 
propose (Figure 2). For the reasons outlined above, the methodology is initially founded on (BSI, 
2008). Each step produces a result artefact (depicted in the grey boxes on the right). 
 Figure 2. PIA methodology overview 
3.1 Step 1 – Characterisation of the application 
The goal of this first step is to clearly identify the scope as well as the boundaries and thus the assets 
(resources and information) that need to be protected and thus considered throughout the impact 
assessment. The comprehensiveness and the level of detail of the characterisation have an influence on 
the successful execution of a PIA. Risks may not be identified due to missing information in the 
application characterisation. The characterisation should therefore contain: application and system 
components, roles, generic business processes, detailed use cases, data flow diagrams (of internal and 
external data flows) as well as categories of processed data. This information can either be derived 
from requirements and design documents when the application is still in the initiation, design or 
development phase. If the application is already operational, relevant information needs to be collected 
from its production environment. Thus, information gathering is not restricted to a specific phase but it 
can be conducted throughout the impact assessment process. As a result the application 
characterisation gains more and more detail so that the risk evaluation can be based on a sound 
foundation. 
3.2 Step 2 – Definition of privacy targets 
The purpose of a risk assessment is to understand what is at risk. Existing security risk assessments 
take the application characterisation from step 1 as a basis and then identify the assets described 
therein as security targets that need to be protected. The above-described security risk assessment 
standards offer lists of security targets that can be used in the assessment of an application. Such a 
guideline does not yet exist for the consideration of privacy issues. Many catalogues of potential 
privacy targets exist (Rost, 2011). Consequently one of our constructs is a list of systematically 
derived privacy targets from the relevant legal frameworks. Taking EU legislation and thus the 
European Data Protection Directive (EC, 1995) as a starting point, results in 8 privacy targets and 16 
more concrete sub targets that can be specified as depicted in Table 1. 
 
Privacy target code and name Sub targets 
P1.1 Ensuring fair and lawful processing through transparency 
P1.2 Providing purpose specification and limitation 
P1.3 Ensuring data avoidance and minimisation 
P1.4 Ensuring quality of data 
P1 Safeguard of quality of personal 
data  
P1.5 Ensuring limited duration of data storage 
P2 Legitimacy of processing 
personal data 
P2.1 Legitimacy of processing personal data 
P3 Legitimacy of processing 
sensitive personal data 
P3.1 Legitimacy of processing sensitive personal data 
P4.1 Providing adequate information in cases of direct collection 
of data from the data subject 
P4 Compliance with the data 
subject's right to be informed 
P4.2 Providing adequate information where the data has not been 
obtained directly from the data subject 
P5.1 Facilitating the provision of information about processed 
data and purpose 
P5.2 Facilitating the rectification, erasure or blocking of data 
P5 Compliance with the data 
subject's right to access, correct 
and erase data 
P5.3 Facilitating the notification to third parties about 
rectification, erasure and blocking of data 
P6.1 Facilitating the objection to the processing of personal data, 
direct marketing activities and disclosure of data to third 
parties 
P6 Compliance with the data 
subject's right to object 
P7.1 Facilitating the objection to being subject to decisions that 
are solely based on automated processing of data 
P7 Safeguard of confidentiality and 
security of processing 
P7.1 Safeguarding confidentiality and security of processing 
P8 Compliance with notification 
requirements 
P8.1 Compliance with notification requirements 
Table 1. Generic privacy targets and concrete sub targets 
In order to address the second of the above-mentioned (Subsection 2.2) problems of existing security 
risk assessments, at the outset of this second step, each privacy target needs to be described against the 
background of the respective industry or company context. Seen the wide spectrum of the privacy 
concept as well as national laws or industry-specific regulations more targets can and should be added. 
3.3 Step 3 – Evaluation of degree of protection demand for each privacy 
target 
The leading question of this third step is “What would happen if …?”. The goal is to identify the 
degree of protection demand that is feasible for each privacy target. Damage scenarios that consider 
the impact that would result from potential privacy breaches are used. This evaluation of privacy 
targets differs from the evaluation of security targets in that we focus less on the loss of assets, but 
consider more of the ‘soft’ implications that privacy breaches have. As we are dealing with 
applications that process personal information of customers or employees, it is not sufficient to only 
consider the operator’s perspective and reflect on reputational or financial damages that can ensue for 
an operator, but it is essential to also consider the data subject’s perspective and to reflect on damages 
that can ensue for the data subject (e.g. reputation, financial well being, personal freedom). Table 2 
describes these two perspectives and adds three degrees of protection demand (low, medium and high) 
that can help to systematically evaluate the degree of protection demand for a privacy target. 
 
Criteria for the assessment of protection demand 
Application operator perspective Data subject perspective 
Protection 
demand 
Impact on 
reputation and 
brand value 
Financial loss Social standing, 
reputation 
Financial well 
being 
Personal 
freedom 
Low – 1 The impact of any loss or damage is limited and calculable. 
Medium – 2 The impact of any loss or damage is considerable. 
High – 3 The impact of any loss or damage is devastating. 
Table 2. Protection demand categories and perspectives 
For each privacy target, the evaluations of the five criteria are then combined using the maximum 
principle resulting in an overall evaluation. In a later state (step 5) of the assessment, this evaluation 
helps to choose privacy controls that are corresponding in strength and vigour. 
3.4 Step 4 – Identification of threats for each privacy target 
Based on the defined privacy targets, this step aims at systematically deducing threats for each of the 
privacy targets. These threats can either be generic in terms of the privacy target, technology-, 
application- or context-specific. After identifying the threats, it is necessary to consider the likelihood 
of their occurrence. We differentiate only two levels: likely and not likely. Not all threats may be 
equally probable. Some may not materialise at all from a specific operator’s perspective or in a 
specific operating context. Only those threats will later be mitigated that are likely to occur. 
3.5 Step 5 – Identification and recommendation of existing or new controls 
suited to protect against threats 
The crucial step in the assessment process is to identify controls that can help to minimise, mitigate or 
eliminate the identified threats. Controls can either be of a technical or non-technical nature. Technical 
controls are directly incorporated into a system, e.g. access control and authentication mechanisms; 
pseudonymisation, anonymisation and encryption methods. Non-technical controls, on the other hand, 
are management and operational controls as well as accountability measures, e.g. policies or 
operational procedures and information measures taken vis-à-vis data subjects. Furthermore, controls 
can be categorised as being either preventive or detective. Preventive controls inhibit violation 
attempts, while detective controls warn operators about violations or attempted violations. Keeping in 
mind that PIAs have the goal to foster privacy-by-design, there should be a focus on identifying and 
recommending preventive controls. 
For each threat, controls need to be identified and for each control, three levels of effectiveness (low, 
medium and high) need to be defined. These levels need to be taken into account when recommending 
a control, because the control’s level of effectiveness should match the beforehand-identified (in step 
3) degree of protection demand. E.g. high protection demands combined with likely threats should be 
mitigated with highly effective controls. 
3.6 Step 6 – Assessment and documentation of residual risks 
The list of recommended controls that results from step 5 needs to be considered during the now 
following risk mitigation phase. Recommended controls need to be evaluated, e.g. concerning 
feasibility and effectiveness, a cost-benefit analysis can be conducted, which then results into a list of 
prioritised controls. The result is a control implementation plan, from which residual risks are derived. 
Residual risks remain for example if an implemented control reduces the magnitude of the impact of a 
threat but does not eliminate the threat completely due to technical or business reasons. 
4 Utility evaluation of the proposed artefacts 
An important aspect of design science research is the evaluation of the proposed artefacts. To 
demonstrate the utility of our artefacts, we follow Hevner et al. (2004), who suggested five evaluation 
methods, two of which are appropriate for the context we have studied. The first is the observational 
approach, which is exemplified by case study and interviewing methods. In subsection 4.1, we report 
the results of several workshops with IT industry experts who assessed the use of the proposed 
artefacts. We additionally use the second evaluation method, the descriptive approach, by employing 
the informed argument method using information from the knowledge base of our research domain to 
build arguments for the utility of our proposed artefacts. In subsection 4.2, we again use the 
descriptive approach by employing the scenario method and report the results of three scenarios and 
their resulting PIAs. With the completion of these evaluation methods, we also address the above-
mentioned (Subsection 2.2) problems of existing security risk assessments. We use profound research 
methods to evaluate content and quality of our proposed artefacts and not only rely on common 
practice. 
4.1 Workshops with industry experts 
Conducting interviews, in our case in the form of workshops, is one of the most important gathering 
tools in qualitative research (Myers and Newman, 2007). Each workshop was structured as follows: 
(1) we explained our PIA methodology and the constructs, (2) the experts conducted a PIA based on 
an exemplary scenario we had prepared in advance, and thus evaluated the utility of our proposed 
artefacts in a context of use, (3) the experts were asked to suggest potential improvements that might 
be appropriate to our proposed artefacts. We ensured that all three parts of the workshop were 
completed; however related topics of discussion were permitted in order to increase the richness of the 
information captured. The workshops took on average 4 to 6 hours. The information was captured in 
the form of result protocols. 
We worked with a set of industry experts with participants from 5 distinct stakeholder groups: (1) 
general risk manager, (2) IT department manager, (3) technology innovations manager with a strong 
background in technical security management, (4) member of a governmental institution, which is 
focused on information security, with a strong background in theoretical risk management and 
mathematics and (5) academic researchers. We worked with a total of 7 experts. 
In general, all participants found value in our proposed artefacts for conducting a systematic and step-
by-step PIA. The following three key dimensions about the utility of our proposed artefacts 
consistently emerged in the participants’ opinions: 
Documentation comprehensiveness: The comprehensive documentation of an application 
characterisation as required in step 1 is considered to be necessary in terms of a successful impact 
assessment but also expensive in terms of the amount of time and labour that needs to be invested, at 
least at the beginning. Participants agree that such comprehensive documentation is not readily 
available in a typical company where the main interest generally lies in a running application and not 
in a well-documented one. Furthermore, some participants were concerned about publishing such 
detailed company internal information to external parties like data protection authorities or customers. 
As the concept of a PIA indeed does recommend publishing a PIA report, which can be one of the 
resulting artefacts of step 6, it does not specify the level of detail that should be published. Thus, it 
seems to be acceptable to create a PIA report for the public that does not contain all internal 
information especially no confidential information, but enough information so that an external party 
can comprehend the decisions that were taken throughout the PIA. 
Complexity reduction: All of the participants highly valued the given privacy targets, especially the 
16 concrete sub targets (see Table 1). The privacy targets systematically structure the confusing 
(because of the legal language) and extensive landscape of privacy requirements in a way that 
practitioners feel confident to work with. Nevertheless, it remained the problem of the ‘correct’ 
interpretation of some of the targets. Especially the target P1.1 ‘Ensuring fair and lawful processing 
through transparency’ resulted in discussions on how to interpret ‘transparency’ and what might be the 
measures to ensure transparency. Interestingly, this problem of ‘correct’ interpretation was not 
considered to be insurmountable; discussions always lead to a certain interpretation and participants 
agreed to consult legal personnel if necessary. 
Qualitative evaluation: The workshops lead to the conclusion that in both steps (3 and 4) where an 
evaluation is needed, a qualitative approach is the most feasible for practitioners. First there is the 
evaluation of the degree of protection demand for each of the privacy targets. As already indicated 
above, the evaluation of the impact that results from a privacy breach is different from evaluating the 
impact of security breaches (e.g. a loss of availability might be easily quantifiable in terms of business 
losses). The two perspectives (operator and data subject; see Table 2) we proposed were considered to 
be very helpful to evaluate the ‘soft’ factors that are typical for impacts of privacy breaches. Second 
there is the evaluation of the likelihood of each identified threat. Participants heavily discussed 
whether it should not be possible to assign a quantitative probability to each threat, but the nature of 
most of the threats did not make this a feasible approach. Thus, for the time being we settled on the 
simple differentiation between likely and unlikely. 
4.2 Three scenarios and exemplary PIAs 
The scenario method of the descriptive approach is described as follows: “Construct detailed scenarios 
around the artefact to demonstrate its utility.” (Hevner et al., 2004) We translated the above described 
methodology and constructs, which are generally applicable, to a ‘PIA guideline for RFID 
applications’ (BSI, 2011) thus targeting specific IT applications, namely those who use RFID 
technology. The herein defined privacy targets and protection demand categories were taken as is but a 
additional list of 60 threats and 27 controls was compiled, which are feasible in the context of RFID 
applications. Additionally, we constructed three comprehensive scenarios: (1) a retail scenario 
involving an RFID-enabled loyalty card and tagged products, (2) a public transport scenario using 
RFID-enabled tickets and pay-per-use models, and (3) an automotive scenario involving an RFID 
controlled assembly and an RFID-enabled employee access card (BSI, 2011). All three scenarios were 
developed with the help of industry partners in order to describe business and use cases that are 
realistic. We then conducted exemplary PIAs for all of the three scenarios using our described 
methodology and constructs and documented the six steps in detail. 
The accomplishment of the exemplary PIAs leads to several key findings. These key findings have 
consequences for the design of the RFID applications and for related business processes. Thus, in all 
three scenarios, the findings of a systematic PIA lead to system design, function and process 
adaptations in terms of privacy-by-design. 
Retail scenario: In short, this scenario is composed of an RFID-enabled loyalty card, tagged products, 
RFID-enabled shop-floor applications (e.g. smart-trolley, smart-shelf, self-checkout) and added-value 
services (especially for expensive goods). The consideration of P1.1 and its related threats results in 
controls that require a lot of effort to extensively inform customers about the involved technology, the 
customer data that is collected and how this data is processed, so that customers can make informed 
decisions. Furthermore, it is required to separate logistical from customer data (P1.2 and P1.3), to 
implement fine-grained access rights and to regularly update assigned access rights (P1.2 and P7.1), to 
implement deletion rules that guarantee that customer data that is no longer needed for the specified 
purpose is deleted or anonymised (P1.5 and P1.3), to offer personalised as well as pseudonymised 
loyalty cards to customers (P1.3), to kill all product tags during checkout and to not kill a product tag 
if a customer utters the explicit wish to use the (expensive) product later on in conjunction with added-
value services (P1.2 and P7.1). 
Public transport scenario: In short, this scenario is composed of a ticket (e.g. a dedicated RFID-
enabled card, a multi-application card or an NFC mobile device), entitlements that can be loaded onto 
this ticket, vehicles and gates of the public transport system that automatically read these tickets. The 
consideration of P1.3 and its related threats results in controls that require the public transport operator 
to not only offer personalised and pseudonymised tickets but also anonymised tickets, so that 
customers can still use public transport in an anonymous way. Furthermore, it is required to implement 
and regularly update fine-grained access rights to the collected data (e.g. in order to prevent the 
disclosure of customers’ movement profiles) (P1.2 and P7.1), to implement deletion rules that 
guarantee that customer data that is no longer needed for the specified purpose is deleted (P1.5 and 
P1.3), to provide extensive information material so that customers can make informed decisions 
(P1.1), to ensure that customer data is correct and up-to-date so that monthly or best-price bills are 
correct (P1.4). 
Automotive scenario: This scenario is twofold; in-house and outbound logistics of a car manufacturer 
are managed with the help of RFID-technology (e.g. car bodies and security-relevant/upscale modules 
are tagged) and access control to the facilities is managed with the help of an RFID-enabled employee 
card. The consideration of P1.3 and its related threats results in controls that require the car 
manufacturer and the car dealer to kill all tags before handing the car over to the customer. If some of 
the tags (e.g. on security-relevant modules) are intended to remain activated for defect management 
and recall purposes, these tags need to be cryptographically secured. In the case of the employee card, 
not only personal but also sensitive personal data is processed because the human resource 
management system is involved in the personalisation of the cards and in the assignment of access 
rights to individual employees. This leads to strong requirements for the implementation of access 
rights to the processed data (P1.2 and P7.1) and the assurance of the legitimacy of processing of this 
data (P2.1 and P3.1). 
5 Conclusions, limitations and future work 
Following the design science research paradigm, the major theoretical contribution of this research is 
the development of a new set of artefacts designed to help practitioners and researchers to understand 
the relevant privacy regulation landscape better and to analyse and assess privacy issues in a 
systematic step-by-step process. Specifically, the artefacts provide tools for representing privacy 
requirements in the form of privacy targets, evaluating the degree of protection demand of these 
targets and to systematically derive threats and adequate controls. We build on prior risk assessment 
experiences and research especially in the security risk assessment area. We evaluated the proposed 
artefacts using two methods that are asked for in theoretical design science research. First, we used 
qualitative workshops with IT industry experts to assess the use of the proposed artefacts by 
practitioners. Second, we used scenario construction to demonstrate the applicability of our artefacts in 
the context of three realistic RFID application scenarios. 
In this research we focused on the development of the methodology and the supporting constructs and 
we did not consider the integration of our step-by-step methodology into the existing risk management 
process landscape of a company. Although, we explicitly chose to base our methodology on existing 
security risk assessments to facilitate such an integration, we did not yet examine if this is actually the 
case. 
To continue to provide useful tools to practitioners we already implemented an instantiation of our 
artefacts in the form of a web application and plan to do case studies to further evaluate the utility of 
our proposed artefacts. 
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